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Abstract—By leveraging the principle of software polyculture
to ensure security in a network, we proposed a vulnerability-
based software diversity metric to determine how a network
topology can be adapted to minimize security vulnerability
while maintaining maximum network connectivity. Our proposed
software diversity-based adaptation (SDA) scheme estimates a
node’s software diversity based on the vulnerabilities of software
packages installed on other nodes on attack paths reachable
to the node and employs it for edge adaptations, such as
removing an edge with a neighboring node that exposes high
security vulnerability because two connected nodes use the same
software packages or a neighboring node may have high software
vulnerability or adding an edge with another node with less or
no security vulnerability because the two nodes use different
software packages or have low vulnerabilities associated with
them. To validate the proposed SDA scheme, we conducted
extensive experiments comparing the proposed SDA scheme with
counterpart baseline schemes in real networks. Our simulation
experimental results proved the outperformance of our proposed
SDA compared to the existing counterparts and provided in-
sightful findings in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of
the proposed SDA scheme under three real network topologies
with vastly different network density.
Index Terms—Software polyculture, software diversity, shuf-
fling, network resilience, network adaptation, epidemic attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Inspired by the close relationship between the diversity of
species and the resilience of ecosystems [40], information and
software assurance research has evolved to include the concept
of software diversity for enhanced security [16, 17, 26, 27, 37].
Due to the dominant trend of software monoculture deploy-
ment for efficiency and effectiveness of service provisions, at-
tackers have been granted significant advantages in that acquir-
ing the intelligence needed to compromise a single software
vulnerability enables the capability of efficiently compromis-
ing other homogeneous system components, such as operating
systems, software packages, and/or hardware packages [43].
To deny this advantage, the concept of diversity has been
applied in the cybersecurity literature [24]. Randomization of
software features has been used to thwart cyber attacks by
increasing uncertainty towards a target system whose critical
information was known to an attacker previously. The concept
of moving target defense (MTD) [19, 32] has been proposed to
change the attack surface in order to increase uncertainty and
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confusion for attackers and software diversity-based security
mechanisms have also been used as part of MTD techniques.
Research has shown that software diversity is closely related
to enhancing the immunization of a computer system that halts
multiple outbreaks of malware infections simultaneously oc-
curring with heterogeneous and sparse spreading patterns [36].
Hence, the rationale that software diversity reduces malware
spreading is quite well known and has been validated for its
effectiveness to some extent [16, 17]. This underlying phi-
losophy encompasses a simple principle: software polyculture
enhances security [16]. Due to the accessibility to the Internet,
which enables the distribution of individualized software and
cloud computing with the computational power to perform
diversification, massive-scale software diversity is becoming
a realistic and practical approach to enhance security [26].
Although the benefit of software diversity seems obvious, its
secure and transparent implementation of automatic software
diversity is highly challenging [27]. In addition, no prior
work has considered software diversity metrics as the basis
to adapt a network topology to balance network connectivity
and system security where each node’s software vulnerability
is incorporated into estimating each node’s software diversity.
In this work, we are interested in developing a software
diversity metric to measure a node’s software diversity based
on software vulnerabilities of intermediate nodes on attack
paths reachable to the node.
B. Research Problem
In this work, we develop a software diversity metric for
measuring a network topology in terms of minimizing security
vulnerabilities against epidemic attacks (e.g., malware/virus
spreading) while maintaining a sufficient level of network
connectivity to provide seamless service availability. The pro-
posed software diversity metric can be used to make decisions
related to which two nodes should be disconnected or con-
nected in order to construct an improved network topology
meeting these two goals, minimizing security vulnerability
and maximizing network connectivity. However, identifying
the optimal network topology requires an exponential solution
complexity [42]. In this work, we propose a heuristic method
called software diversity-based adaptation (SDA) to generate
a better network topology that is resilient against epidemic
attacks with a sufficiently high network connectivity where the
deployment cost is acceptable. We leverage percolation the-
ory [36], which has been used to describe the process or paths
of some liquid passing through a medium. We use this theory
to model and analyze attack processes and defense or recovery
processes by using site or bond percolation. Site percolation
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(i.e., removing a node) [36] is used to model an attacker’s
behavior in compromising another node, implying that the
node being percolated refers to the node being compromised
(infected) by the attacker, leading to the disconnection of all
edges around the node to reflect its failure or its being detected
by an intrusion detection system (IDS). Bond percolation
is used to adjust edges between nodes such that connected
nodes with high security vulnerability (e.g., two connected
nodes have the same software package installed or a neighbor
node has high software vulnerability) are disconnected while
disconnected nodes with low or no security vulnerability (e.g.,
two disconnected nodes using a different software with low
software vulnerability) can be connected in a given network.
C. Key Contributions
We made the following key contributions in this work:
• This work is the first that takes a multidisciplinary approach
by considering both the computer science’s software di-
versity to enhance cybersecurity and percolation theoretic
network resilience techniques to study the effect of intercon-
nectivity on network connectivity under epidemic attacks.
To be specific, we develop network adaptation strategies
that determine whether to add or remove edges between
two nodes in a given network, aiming to minimize network
vulnerabilities against epidemic attacks while maintaining
maximum network connectivity. Given that each node is
installed with a set of software (we call it a ‘software pack-
age’), we investigate network resilience and vulnerability
depending on how a network topology is connected under
epidemic attackers who can exploit the vulnerabilities based
on their knowledge on software vulnerabilities.
• We develop a novel software diversity metric that measures
a node’s software diversity level, representing both the vul-
nerabilities of attack paths reachable to the node and the net-
work connectivity. To minimize computational complexity
in estimating the node’s software diversity based on attack
path vulnerability, we introduce a node’s local network only
based on the node’s k-hop neighbors. This approach allows
us to provide a lightweight method to compute each node’s
software diversity. To prove the effectiveness of this software
diversity metric, we use it as the criterion to determine
whether to add/remove an edge between two nodes.
• Although most software diversity-based network topology
adaptations are studied by shuffling the types of software
packages [42, 43], our work takes one step further by
changing network topology, which is proven much more
effective than its software shuffling counterpart (e.g., graph
coloring) in reducing vulnerability to epidemic attacks
while maximizing the network connectivity. In addition,
our proposed software diversity-based network adaptations
are lightweight showing acceptable operational cost while
achieving minimum security vulnerability and maximum
network connectivity, which opens a door for the applicabil-
ity in resource-constrained, contested network environments.
• We validate the outperformance of the proposed SDA strat-
egy by conducting a comprehensive comparative perfor-
mance analysis with the following six schemes (see Section
V-B): non-adaptation, random adaptation, graph-coloring,
and three variants of the proposed SDA strategies. We
analyze the effect of key design parameters such as network
density, attack density, and the number of software packages
available on four performance metrics (see Section V-A),
i.e., the size of a giant component, the fraction of undetected
compromised nodes, software diversity levels, and defense
cost (i.e., shuffling plus network topology adaptation costs).
We validate the outperformance of our SDA scheme in
three real network topologies covering dense (high), medium
dense, and sparse (low) networks [28]. Further, to pro-
foundly understand the effect of various network character-
istics, we conduct sensitivity analysis under a random graph
using the Erdös-Rényi (ER) network model and analyze the
results. Due to space constraints, we placed these results for
the ER network in Sections C.2–C.3 of the appendix file.
We will discuss the answers of the research questions in
Section VI and conclude them in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
This section provides an overview of related work and
background literature in terms of the percolation theory studied
for network resilience in Network Science and the software
diversity-based approaches studied for system security in
Computer Science.
A. Percolation Theoretic Network Resilience
Percolation theory has been substantially used to investigate
network resilience (or robustness) in Network Science. Site
percolation and bond percolation are commonly used to select
a node or an edge to remove or add, to model the choice of
nodes to immunize in the context of epidemics on networks,
such as disease transmission, computer malware/virus spread-
ing, or behavior propagation (e.g., product adoption) [11, 36].
Recently, percolation theory was leveraged to develop software
diversity techniques particularly to solve a software assign-
ment problem [42, 43] because how nodes are connected mat-
ters in propagating malware infection while choosing nodes
or edges to add or remove is exactly following the concept of
site or bond percolation in percolation theory [36].
The origins of percolation theory come from the mathe-
matical formalization of statistical physics research on the
flow of liquid through a medium [15]. Percolation theory has
been substantially applied to networks to study connectivity,
robustness [5, 36], reliability [29], and epidemics [6, 34]. The
percolation process was studied in computer science under
the notion of “network resilience” [10, 35, 39], independent
of its development in the statistical physics literature. More
recent developments in the physics literature have profoundly
influenced studies in the computer science. These contributions
have incorporated the recognition that networks are not derived
from a random structure, and failures of nodes, whether from
attacks or due to dependent correlations, are not uniformly
random [2]. Hence, significant interest has developed in re-
moval processes that model targeted attacks on the network
using a centrality metric. In the network science domain, the
degree of network resilience is commonly measured based on
the size of the giant component (i.e., the largest connected
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component in a given network), which gives a clear sense of
how the network is connected with a portion of existing nodes
even after a certain number of nodes or edges are removed.
Percolation theory has been used to model various processes
on networks in the context of network failures or attacks, e.g.,
connectivity, routing, and epidemic spreading [10, 35].
B. Software Diversity-based Cybersecurity
Many approaches have been explored to validate the use-
fulness of software or network diversity to ensure network
security. Chen and May [7] investigated the usefulness of
software diversity to enhance security. Huang et al. [21, 22]
solved a software assignment problem by isolating nodes with
the same software to minimize the effect of epidemic worm at-
tacks. Franz [14] proposed an approach to introduce compiler-
generated software diversity for a large scale network, aiming
to create hurdles for attackers and eliminate any advantage
of knowing the vulnerabilities of a single software. Homescu
et al. [18] presented a large-scale automated software diver-
sification to mitigate the vulnerabilities exposed by software
monoculture. Yang et al. [42, 43] proposed a software diversity
technique to combat sensor worms by solving a software as-
signment problem, given a limited number of software versions
available. The authors used percolation theory to model the
design features of software diversity to defend against sensor
worms.
Zhang et al. [45] developed a resilient, heterogeneous
networking-based system where a single solution was common
to increase interoperability. Recently, network diversity is
proposed as a security metric to measure network resilience
against zero-day attacks [44]. Inspired by the network diversity
metrics [44], Li et al. [31] further developed the network
model and diversity metric based on vulnerability similarity,
configuration constraints and multi-label hosts. Hosseini and
Azgomi [20] mathematically analyzed the malware propaga-
tion under a network with six different types of nodes in an
epidemic model. They proved a positive correlation between
network security and the degree of network diversity. Prieto
et al. [38] proposed an optimal software assignment algorithm
with multiple software packages to enhance network resilience
under attacks.
Although the above works discussed the concept of software
diversity to ensure system security, their aim is to solve a
software assignment problem by shuffling different types of
software packages among nodes without changing the network
topology. Unlike the software assignment approach, we aim to
generate an optimal network topology that is resilient against
epidemic attacks while maximizing network connectivity. The
proposed software diversity metric is designed for each node
to make a decision on whether to add or remove an edge
based on the vulnerabilities on the attack paths reachable to
the node [8, 23].
III. SYSTEM MODEL
This section discusses our system model in terms of the
network model, the node model, the attack model, and the
defense model.
A. Network Model
In this work, we are concerned with a special distributed
network environment where each node belongs to a set of
regional coordinators. Examples include a software-defined
network (SDN) where each node can be instructed by an SDN
controller it belongs to [25], an edge computing Internet-of-
Things (IoT) system with some high computing edge nodes
available to perform high computing tasks [30], and a hierar-
chical mobile ad hoc network with decentralized controllers
in charge of governing the nodes under their control [9].
Periodic information exchange between nodes and the regional
coordinators is required to ensure seamless operations of the
system. However, since each node’s software diversity value,
which is used to make a decision on edge adaptation (i.e.,
adding/removing edges), is computed locally by each node,
a regional coordinator will only need to rank the software
diversity values of neighbor nodes around a target node, and
inform the target node of which edges to add/remove based
on the estimated ranks. Moreover, the ranking operation of
the neighbor nodes around a target node is only periodically
performed by a regional coordinator and will not require high
communication overhead for each node to communicate with
the regional coordinator.
A temporal network is an undirected network for which the
topology evolution (or change) occurs due to node failures or
nodes being compromised by attackers. In addition, the net-
work may change its topology when adaptation strategies are
performed by connecting between two nodes or disconnecting
all the edges associated with compromised nodes to mitigate
the spread of infection over the network. We denote the set of
nodes in the network by nodes i’s, characterized by a set of
attributes as shown in Section III-B. An edge between nodes
can be on and off depending on the dynamics caused by node
failures, node recovery, or edge adaptations (i.e., an edge can
be added or removed). We maintain an adjacency matrix A
in order to keep track of direct or indirect connectivities (i.e.,
edges) between nodes where aij = 1 indicates there exists an
edge between nodes i and j while aij = 0 indicates that no
edge exists.
In order for each node to efficiently estimate its software
diversity by considering the vulnerabilities of attack paths
reachable to the node, it only considers neighboring nodes
within k-hop distance from itself. We call it a node’s k-hop
local network. This local network is used for each node to
estimate its software diversity value by considering the vul-
nerabilities of attack paths available within its local network.
Although we will maintain the value of k as a sufficiently
small number (e.g., 1 or 2), it does not underestimate the
vulnerabilities of possible attack paths because using smaller
k means taking a conservative perspective that an attacker is
quite close enough such as being within the local network.
For example, if an attacker wants to compromise a particular
target node, it may try multiple attack paths where each attack
path has a set of intermediate nodes. When the attack path is
long, it means the vulnerability of the target node is low as
the attacker needs to compromise all the intermediate nodes in
order to finally compromise the target node. However, when
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the path length is small, it does not necessarily decrease the
attack vulnerability because the attacker is close to the target
node.
We assume that software packages installed in each node
and the associated vulnerabilities information are given to the
regional coordinator in the initial network deployment period.
In addition, we assume that each node is also well informed
about the software vulnerability information associated with
the software packages installed in the neighboring nodes in
its k-hop local network. We assume that the changes of
network topology are mainly made by node failures or network
adaptations in this work.
Adding or removing an edge between two nodes requires
secure communications between them. Even if they are within
wireless range of each other but don’t share a secret key
for secure communications, they are not logically connected.
In this work, generating an optimal network topology which
is resilient against epidemic attacks with maximum network
connectivity is based on a logical network topology.
B. Node Model
Each node i is characterized by its attributes as:
• A node i’s status on whether it is active or not, denoted by
nai, indicating whether it is alive (= 1) or failed (= 0),
respectively;
• A node i’s status on whether the node is compromised (= 1)
or non-compromised (= 0), denoted by nci;
• A node i’s software package installed, representing the di-
versified package or version of the same software providing
the same functionality. In this work, we adopt the well-
known software diversification approach called N-version
programming [3, 4]. This concept means that a software has
multiple independent implementations while the different
implementations of the software still can provide same
functionalities while the implementations are different and
naturally have different bugs or vulnerabilities. Following
this concept, we model the node’s software package installed
denoted by si with a limited number of software packages
available, Ns, where si is an integer, ranged in [1, Ns];
• A node i’s degree of software diversity, sdi, whose physical
meaning is how different node i’s software package is from
its neighbors. The detail on the computation of node i’s
software diversity are elaborated in Eq. (3); and
• A node i has software vulnerability derived from the soft-
ware package si it is installed with, which is denoted by
svi.
Based on the above five attributes, node i is characterized by:
node(i) = [nai, nci, si, sdi, svi]. (1)
If attacker j targets vulnerable node i (i.e., a node that has
not been compromised before), which is one of its direct
neighbors, the probability that node j infects node i, denoted
by βji, is estimated based on the probability that node j can
exploit the vulnerability of node i’s software package, si. We
estimate this probability based on node i’s vulnerability to
node j, estimated by [16]:
βji =
{
1 if σj(si) > 0;
svi otherwise,
(2)
where σj is a vector of software packages attacker j has
learned about their security vulnerabilities. For example, at-
tacker j knows the vulnerabilities of software package 1
and 3 among 5 packages available. It is denoted by σj =
[1, 0, 1, 0, 0]. In this case, the sum of σj indicates the number
of software packages attacker j knows the vulnerabilities of
and so can exploit. Note that it is a dynamic value learned after
node j compromises node i via reconnaissance even if their
installed software packages are different, i.e., si 6= sj . Here svi
refers to the vulnerability of software package si, which can be
estimated based on the the degree of a Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE) with a Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS) severity score [1, 13]. A node’s mean vul-
nerability is simply obtained by the scaled mean vulnerability
across multiple vulnerabilities in [0, 10] where the maximum
vulnerability score is 10 in CVSS. We normalize the value
ranged in [0, 1] as a real number.
C. Attack Model
This work deals with two stages of attack behaviors: An
outside attacker before the node is compromised and an inside
attacker after the node is compromised but undetected.
(1) Node Compromise by Epidemic Attacks: We consider
the so called epidemic attack which describes an attacker’s
infection behavior based on an epidemic model, called the
SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Removed) model [36]. That is, an
outside attacker can compromise the nodes directly connected
to itself, its direct neighbors, without access rights to their
settings or files. Typical example scenarios include the spread
of malwares or viruses. Botnets can spread malwares or
viruses via mobile devices. A mobile device can misuse a
mobile malware, such as a Trojan horse, thus acting as a
botclient to receive commands and controls from a remote
server [33]. Further, worm-like attacks are popular in wireless
sensor networks where the sensor worm attacker sends a
message to exploit the software vulnerability in order to cause
a crash or take control of sensor nodes [42, 43]. Attacker
j can compromise its direct neighbor i when node i uses
a software package that attacker j can exploit because the
attacker knows the vulnerability of the software package.
This case happens when si is the same as sj or attacker j
learned si’s vulnerability in the past (i.e., σj(si) > 0). When
attacker j is installed with a particular software package, sj ,
we assume that attacker j knows the vulnerability of its own
software package, sj . Attacker j can learn the vulnerabilities
of other software packages although it needs to commit more
time and resources to obtain the information of their security
vulnerabilities. Node i’s vulnerability by attacker j based
on these two cases is reflected in Eq. (2). When node i is
compromised, node i’s status is changed from ‘susceptible’ to
‘infected’ indicating that node i is now an attacker. Then, node
i can infect other nodes and learn their software vulnerabilities,
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which are unknown to it. The attack procedures are described
in Algorithm 8 of the appendix file.
(2) Malicious Behavior of Compromised Nodes Undetected
by the IDS: Even if an intrusion detection system (IDS) is
assumed to be placed in this work (see Section III-D below), an
attacker may not be detected by the IDS and the inside attacker
can perform malicious behaviors such as packet dropping
attacks (e.g., gray or black hole attacks), data exfiltration
attacks, or denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to compromise the
security goals in terms of loss of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability [12, 41].
D. Defense Model
We assume that a system is equipped with an IDS, which
detects infected (i.e., compromised) nodes. When infected
node i is detected by the IDS, we model the detection
probability with γ representing the removal probability in
the SIR model. The response to the detected node will be
performed by disconnecting all the edges connected to the
detected attacker, which corresponds to removing the node
from the system based on the concept of site percolation. Note
that the development of an IDS is beyond the scope of this
work. We simply consider the IDS characterized by a false
positive probability and a false negative probability, both of
which have the value of 1− γ.
IV. SOFTWARE DIVERSITY BASED ADAPTATION
ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, we describe our proposed software diversity
based adaptation (SDA) algorithm design in detail. SDA uses
software diversity as a key determinant to select edges to
percolate (i.e., add or remove) for mitigating the spreading
of compromised nodes by epidemic attackers and also to
maximize the network connectivity for network resilience.
A. Software Diversity Metric
A node’s vulnerability is commonly computed based on its
software package installed [16, 17]. However, if the node is
connected with many other nodes that are directly or indirectly
connected, its potential vulnerability is not simply restricted
by the vulnerability of its own software package. We use
a broader concept of node vulnerability by embracing the
vulnerabilities of attack paths reachable to each node. To
better capture the relationship between node vulnerability and
network topology, we utilize an attack path AP an attacker
can take to successfully compromise a target node. That is,
in order to compromise the target node, the attacker needs to
compromise all intermediate nodes on the attack path. Hence,
we estimate each node’s software diversity value which refers
to the probability that a node is robust against vulnerabilities
from attack paths AP ’s reachable to the node.
To this end, we consider the shortest paths (i.e., maximum
k-hop distance paths) between boundary nodes (i.e., nodes in
the boundary of a target node’s local network) to a target
node as attack paths. In addition, to reduce the complexity
of measuring each node’s software diversity, we use a limited
number of attack paths, denoted by l, where each path has
at most k-hop distance. Target node i’s software diversity,
denoted by sdi(k, l), is obtained by:
sdi(k, l) :=
l∏
j∈api
(1− apvkij), (3)
where api is a set of attack paths available to node i
ranked based on their highest vulnerability and apvkij is the
vulnerability of an attack path from node j to node i with the
maximum hop distance k. In order to consider the maximum
number of nodes associated with the attack paths, we consider
disjointed attack paths from the boundary nodes (i.e., j’s) to
node i.
B. Software Diversity based Bond Percolation for Network
Adaptation
The design objective of SDA is to decide which edges to
add or remove in order to maximize the size of the giant
component (i.e., the largest network cluster in a network) for
maintaining network connectivity and to minimize the fraction
of nodes being compromised due to epidemic attacks with
minimum defense cost defined in Section V-A.
We have two tasks to determine which edges to remove or
add as follows:
1) Estimate the gain or loss as a result of removing or
adding an edge based on the difference between a node’s
current software diversity value and its expected software
diversity value after the edge adaptation made between
nodes i and j. To determine if adding an edge between
nodes i and j is beneficial, we compute the software
diversity difference by:
SDAdiff(i, j) = (sdi − sd′i) + (sdj − sd′j), (4)
where sdi = sdi(k, l) and sdj = sdj(k, l) for simplicity
and sdi(k, l) and sdj(k, l) are defined in Eq. (3). sd′i
and sd′j are the expected software diversity values of
nodes i and j after an edge is added. The most promising
candidate edge to be added should be an edge with the
lowest SDAdiff(i, j). sd
′
i is simply obtained by
sd′i = sdi(1− svipvj), (5)
where svi is the software vulnerability of the software
package installed in node i (i.e., si) and pvj is the attack
path vulnerability from node j to the boundary node in
node j’s local network. That is, svipvj is the same as
apvij in Eq. (3) (where we omitted k for simplicity). sd′j
can also be similarly obtained. To determine if removing
the edge between nodes i and j is beneficial, we compute
the software diversity difference by:
SDRdiff(i, j) = (sd
′
i − sdi) + (sd′j − sdj), (6)
where sd′i is computed by:
sd′i = sdi/(1− svipvj). (7)
Here the division by (1−svipvj) represents the extent of
reducing the vulnerability by removing an edge between
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(a) Software diversity estimation of node i (b) Edge adaptations based on software diversity differences
Fig. 1. Example of the software diversity-based adaptation strategies: (a) The estimation of node i’s software diversity value; and (b) The edge adaptation
based on the software diversity difference in Eqs. (4) and (6).
nodes i and j based on Eq. (3). sd′j is similarly obtained
like sd′i above. The most promising candidate edge to be
removed should be an edge with the highest SDRdiff(i, j).
See Algorithm 4 (Generates Edge Addition Candidates
or GEAC) and Algorithm 5 (Generates Edge Removal
Candidates or GERC) of the appendix file that provides
the detail on generating edge candidates for edge addition
and removal, respectively.
2) Estimate how many edges each node can adapt, i.e.,
remove or add. Based on the rationale that high centrality
nodes (e.g., high degree) may expose high vulnerability in
terms of security and network connectivity, we minimize
the difference between the maximum degree and mini-
mum degree by adding more edges to nodes with lower
degree while deleting edges to the nodes with higher
degree. Based on this principle, we develop a heuristic
method to estimate how many edges should be adapted
per node. See Algorithm 3 (Set Edge Adaptations Budget
or SetEAB) of the appendix file for detail.
Algorithm 1 describes our proposed software diversity-based
adaption (SDA) algorithm in detail. It executes Algorithm 1
of the appendix file in Step 1 on line 16 to remove edges
between two nodes with the same software package. It makes
the decision to add/remove edges locally based on the ranks
of the software diversity differences estimated in Step 2 based
on Eqs. (4) and (6), with the objective to best satisfy both
security (i.e., minimum or no impact by epidemic attacks) and
performance (i.e., a sufficient level of network connectivity)
requirements.
Fig. 1 illustrates the SDA algorithm execution with an
example network where distinct software packages are marked
with distinct colors. Fig. 1 (a) illustrates how node i estimates
its software diversity value when k = l = 2. Fig. 1 (b)
illustrates how node i determines whether to add or remove
edges based on the software diversity differences, SDAdiff and
SDRdiff , based on Eqs. (4) and (6), respectively.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we describe performance metrics, coun-
terpart baseline schemes against which our proposed SDA
algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1) is compared for performance
comparison, and simulation environment setup for perfor-
mance evaluation.
A. Performance Metrics
We use the following performance metrics:
• Software diversity (SD): This metric measures the mean
software diversity for all nodes in a network. Since node i’s
software diversity, i.e., sdi, is computed based on Eq. (3),
the mean software diversity for all nodes in the network is
obtained by:
SD =
∑N
i=1 sdi
N
. (8)
Recall that k is used to determine node i’s local network
and thus is the maximum possible hop distance from node
i to all other neighboring nodes in its local network. Higher
software diversity is more desirable to ensure high system
security.
• Size of the giant component (Sg): This metric captures
the degree of network connectivity composed of non-
compromised (uninfected), active nodes in a network. Sg
is computed by:
Sg =
Ng
N
, (9)
where N is the total number of nodes in the network and
Ng is the number of nodes in the giant component. Higher
Sg is more desirable, implying higher network resilience in
the presence of epidemic attacks.
• Fraction of compromised nodes (Pc): This metric mea-
sures the fraction of the number of compromised nodes due
to epidemic attacks over the total number of nodes in a
network. This includes both currently infected (not detected
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Algorithm 1 Software Diversity-based Adaptation (SDA)
1: N ← The total number of nodes in a network
2: DN ← A vector containing the number of removed edges per
node
3: A← An adjacency matrix for a given network with element aij
for i, j = 1, . . . , N
4: S ← A vector of software packages installed over nodes with
element si for i = 1, . . . , N
5: SV ← A vector of the vulnerabilities associated with software
packages
6: SD ← A vector of software diversity values, sdi for all nodes
i = 1, . . . , N
7: PV← A vector of maximum path vulnerabilities for all nodes i
where pvi refers to the maximum attack path vulnerability where
the path consists of at most k − 1-hop distance from node i
8: k ← A hop distance given in a node’s local network
9: l← A maximum number of attack paths considered for estimat-
ing a node’s software diversity
10: ρ← A threshold referring to the fraction of edges to be removed
when ρ < 0 and added when ρ > 0
11: A′ ← An adjacency matrix after edges are adapted in Step 1.
12: A′′ ← An adjacency matrix after edges are adapted in Step 2.
13:
14: A′′ = SDA(N,DN,A,S,SV, k, l, ρ)
15:
16: Step 1: A′ = SDBA(N,DN,A,S)) . Remove
edges between two nodes with the same software package based
on Algorithm 1 of the appendix file).
17:
18: Step 2: Add/remove edges locally based on the ranks of the
software diversity differences estimated in Eqs. (4) and (6)
(Algorithms 4 and 5 of the appendix file)
19: A∗ ← (A′ + I)2k where a∗ij is 1 when nodes i and j belong to
each other’s local network or their neighbors’ local networks; 0
otherwise.
20: SD ← A vector of software diversity where each element,
sdi(k, l), refers to node i’s software diversity value when at most
l number of attack paths are considered where each attack path
has at most k-hop length.
21: PV← A vector of estimated attack path vulnerabilities associ-
ated with each node.
22: candidate← A set of edge candidates . Algorithms 4 and 5
of the appendix file.
23: Tlocal, T global = setEAB(DN,A′, ρ) . Set edge adaptations
budget based on Algorithm 3 of the appendix file.
24: if ρ > 0 then
25: candidate = GEAC(A′,SD,SV,S,PV,Tlocal)
26: . Algorithm 4 in the appendix file.
27: else
28: candidate = GERC(A′,SD,SV,S,PV,Tlocal)
29: . Algorithm 5 in the appendix file.
30: end if
31: A′′ = AdaptNT(A′, candidate,Tlocal, T global, ρ)
32: . Algorithm 6 in the appendix file.
33: return A′′
by the IDS) and removed (previously infected and detected
by the IDS) nodes. Pc is computed by:
Pc =
Nc
N
, (10)
where Nc represents the total number of compromised
nodes after epidemic attacks on a network (i.e., the original
network under No-Adaptation and an adapted network under
all adaptation schemes). See Section V-B for a listing of
counterpart baseline schemes against which our proposed
SDA algorithm is compared for a comparative performance
analysis.
• Defense cost (Dc): This metric measures the defense cost
associated with the following defense strategies employed
by an adaptation scheme: (1) edge adaptations (i.e., adding
or removing edges) to isolate detected attackers (or compro-
mised nodes) by the IDS; (2) edge adaptations to maximize
software diversity by each node based on the value of
the software diversity metric in Eq. (3); and (3) shuffling
operations based on the fraction of nodes whose software
package is randomly shuffled over the total number of nodes.
Dc is computed by:
Dc =
sum(|A−B|)
sum(A+B)
+
NSF
N
(11)
In the first term, the numerator refers to the differences of
edges between the adjacency matrix of an original network
B and that of an adjusted network A after edges adaptations
are made. The denominator is the sum of the additive two
matrices. In the second term, NSF is the number of nodes
whose software packages are shuffled and N is the total
number of nodes. Note that when a node’s software package
is shuffled but stays with its original software package, it is
excluded from counting toward NSF . This shuffling cost is
estimated only when shuffling a software package is used
such as random graph coloring, which is compared against
our proposed SDA scheme in our work. Lower defense cost
is more desirable.
B. Counterpart Baseline Schemes for Performance Compari-
son
In this work, we compare the performance of our proposed
SDA scheme against No-adaptation (No-A), Random adap-
tation (Random-A), and Random graph coloring (Random-
Graph-C) counterpart baseline schemes for a comparative
performance analysis.
Our SDA scheme uses the software diversity-based metric in
Eq. (3) to select an edge to remove or add based on the concept
of bond percolation, as discussed in Section II-A. To be
specific, SDA first removes all edges between two connected
nodes with the same software package as shown in Step 1 of
Algorithm 1 (i.e., executing Algorithm 1 in the appendix file).
Then SDA decides a set of edges to be added or removed
given ρ (the percentage of edges to be added if ρ > 0 or to
be removed if ρ < 0) as shown in Step 2 of Algorithm 1. The
effect of ρ on performance will be analyzed in Section V-C3 to
identify the optimal ρ value that can best balance security and
network connectivity. We experiment with various ρ values
in the range of [−1, 1] where −1 means removing all edges
(such that no edges exist in the network) and 1 means fully
restoring edges removed from Step 1. For example, SDA with
ρ = 1 means fully restoring edges lost from Step 1 while SDA
with ρ = 0 refers to only executing Step 1 (removing edges
between two nodes with the same software package). SDA
with ρ = 0.6 means only restoring 60% of the edges lost in
Step 1 while SDA with ρ = −0.6 means removing 60% of
edges in the network after Step 1. What edges to remove or
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add (see Step 2 of Algorithm 1) significantly affects network
security and resilience.
Below we briefly discuss the three counterpart baseline
schemes to be compared against our proposed SDA schemes:
• No-adaptation (No-A): This represents the case in which
no adaptation is applied, thus showing the effect of attacks
on the performance of the original network. However, we
allow an IDS to detect attackers. When the IDS detects
compromised nodes with probability γ, all edges connected
to the detected attacker will be disconnected in order to
isolate the attackers, ultimately resulting in mitigating the
spread of compromised nodes in the network. Therefore,
when No-A is used, the adaptation cost can be high because
the number of edges disconnected is affected by the network
topology, which is one of the key factors impacting the
degree of network vulnerability.
• Random adaptation (Random-A): This scheme first re-
moves an edge between two nodes with the same software
package (i.e., executing Algorithm 1 in the appendix file)
and then randomly adds edges between nodes with a differ-
ent software package (see Algorithm 7 in the appendix file).
In this scheme, we add the same number of edges lost due
to the execution of Step 1.
• Random graph coloring (Random-Graph-C): This
scheme uses a simple rule for each node to shuffle its
software package with the least common software package
without changing any network topology. As a special case,
when a node has many neighbors, it may choose the
least common software package of those used among its
neighbors. It may occur that a node shuffles to its original
software package. In such a case, when the shuffled software
package is the same as the original software package, we
do not count it toward the shuffling cost in Eq. (11). We
treat this scheme as an adaptation scheme because it also
involves changing a configuration of its software by using
a different implementation although it does not make any
change to the network topology.
The pseudocode for SDA is presented in Algorithm 1 and
that for Random-A is described in Algorithm 7 of the appendix
file. In our experiment, we compare the performance of No-A,
Random-A, Random-Graph-C, and three variants of SDA with
three different thresholds ρ in terms of the 4 performance met-
rics discussed in Section V-A. We treat Random-A, Random-
Graph-C, and the SDA schemes as adaptation schemes while
No-A is treated as a baseline scheme without adaptation.
C. Environment Setup
1) Parameters and Data Collection: Table I summarizes the
key parameters, their meanings, and their default values used
in this work. We use the average of the performance measures
collected based on 100 simulation runs. In the experiment, we
examine the effect of the following key design parameters on
performance: (1) attack density (i.e., percentage of attackers);
and (2) the number of software packages available. For the ER
network, we also study the effect of the network connection
probability on performance in Section C.3 of the appendix file.
TABLE I
KEY DESIGN PARAMETERS, THEIR MEANINGS, AND THEIR DEFAULT
VALUES.
Param. Meaning Value
N Total number of nodes in a network 1000
p Connection probability between pairs of nodes
in a ER network
0.025
γ Intrusion detection probability 0.95
k The upper bound of hops considered in calcu-
lating software diversity SDik,l
[1,2]
l The upper bound of # of paths considered in
calculating software diversity SDik,l
1
nr Number of simulation runs 100
Ns Number of software packages available [3,7]
Pa percentage of attackers in a network [10,30%]
ρ Threshold of fraction of edges adapted [−1, 1]
SV
A vector of vulnerabilities associated with soft-
ware packages which are selected based on the
uniform distribution with the range in (0, 0.5]
(i.e., U(0, 0.5]). For the maximum 7 different
software packages, the SV of the corresponding
vulnerabilities are used.

0.41
0.35
0.48
0.22
0.16
0.19
0.12

T
2) Network Topology Datasets: We setup 4 different undi-
rected networks to evaluate the proposed work: (1) a sparse
network from an observation of the Internet at the autonomous
systems level [28]; (2) a medium dense network derived from
an Enron email network [28]; (3) a dense Facebook ego net-
work [28]; and (4) an Erdös-Rényi (ER) random network [36].
The network topologies and their degree distributions are
shown in Figs. 1 and 2 of the appendix file. Except for
the medium dense network, we use the original network
topologies. For the medium dense network, in order to derive
a network of comparable size with the other networks (the
Enron email network has 36,692 nodes and 183,831 edges)
we generate the medium dense network with 985 nodes and
7,994 edges by taking the following procedures: (i) Rank all
nodes in the Enron email network by degree in a descending
order; (ii) identify the medium dense network as the largest
connected component of the induced subgraph, consisting of
nodes with ranks from 501 to 1500, from the original graph.
3) Optimal Parameter Settings Used for SDA: Fraction of
edges to be adapted (ρ): We have conducted a sensitivity
analysis of ρ for the SDA scheme in terms of maximizing
the size of a giant component (Sg) for network resilience
without overly increasing the fraction of compromised nodes
(Pc) for network security. As shown in Fig. 2, the optimal
ρ for the SDA scheme with respect to Sg and Pc in dense,
medium dense and sparse networks have been identified as
ρ = −0.6, ρ = −0.4 and ρ = 1, respectively. Due to space
constraints, we have conducted the sensitivity analysis of ρ for
the ER random network in Appendix C.2 of the appendix file,
from which we have observed the optimal ρ with respect to Sg
and Pc for the ER random network is −0.6. In summary, the
optimal values of ρ are observed at −0.6, −0.4, 1, and −0.6
for dense, medium dense, sparse, and ER random networks,
respectively.
The number of maximum attack paths (l) and the max-
imum hop distance in each attack path (k): The network
type (i.e., dense, medium dense, sparse, or ER random) affects
node density which in turn can affect the optimal setting of l
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(a) Dense Network (b) Medium Network (c) Sparse Network
Fig. 2. Effect of ρ (fraction of edges to be adapted) on performance of SDA in terms of the size of a giant component (Sg) and the fraction of compromised
nodes (Pc). The optimal ρ for the SDA scheme with respect to Sg and Pc in dense, medium dense, and sparse networks are identified as ρ = −0.6, ρ = −0.4
and ρ = 1, respectively.
and k under which SDA can best achieve both security (i.e.,
a low fraction of compromised nodes) and network resilience
(i.e., a large size of the giant component). We have conducted
a sensitivity analysis of l or k on performance of the SDA
scheme in all four types of networks. Due to space constraints,
we put the sensitivity analysis of l and k on performance of
SDA in Sections D and E of the appendix file. In summary,
for dense, medium dense, and ER random networks, we have
selected k = 1 and l = 1 to calculate software diversity
sdi(k, l) for each node in the network because we have
observed no significant performance improvement with k > 1
and l > 1. For the sparse network, we have not observed high
sensitivity when l > 1. However, for k, we have observed that
SDA performs the best when k = 2 with ρ = 1. Thus, we
have selected k = 2 and l = 1 for the sparse network.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the experimental results for
a comparative performance analysis of the proposed SDA
scheme against the counterpart baseline schemes and provide
physical interpretations of the results. In our experiment, we
compare 6 schemes: (1) Non-adaptation (No-A); (2) Random
adaptation (Random-A); (3) Random graph coloring (Random-
Graph-C); (4) SDA with ρ = 0; (5) SDA with ρ = 1; and
(6) SDA with optimal ρ. See Section V-B for more detail on
how each scheme is implemented. The 6th scheme "SDA with
optimal ρ" is network-type dependent. As discussed earlier in
Section V-C3, the optimal values of ρ are observed at −0.6,
−0.4, 1, and −0.6 for dense, medium dense, sparse, and ER
random networks, respectively.
Initially a set of attackers is randomly and uniformly dis-
tributed to the network based on the percentage of attackers
parameter Pa and all such attackers perform epidemic attacks
as described in Section III-C. See Algorithm 8 of the appendix
file for detail on how the attackers perform epidemic attacks.
Below we only report the experimental results under dense,
medium dense, and sparse networks. The experimental results
under the ER random network are reported in Section C.3 of
the appendix file due to space constraints.
A. Comparative Performance Analysis under a Dense Network
1) Effect of Varying the Fraction of Initial Attacks (Pa):
Fig. 3 shows the effect of varying the attack density (Pa) on
the performance of the six schemes in terms of the four metrics
in Section V-A under the dense network, whose network
topology and degree distribution are shown in Fig. 1 (a) of
the appendix file. We observe that increasing the percentage of
attackers (Pa) decreases software diversity (SD) and the size
of the giant component (Sg) while increasing the percentage
of compromised nodes (Pc) and the defense cost (Dc). We
note that when more nodes are compromised, the defense cost
would also increase since it requires more site percolation
based adaptations to be performed when compromised nodes
are detected by the IDS (i.e., for disconnecting all edges of a
detected, compromised node).
The overall performance order with respect to Pc (represent-
ing network security) and Sg (representing network connec-
tivity and resilience) is observed as: SDA with optimal ρ (set
at −0.6) ≥ SDA with ρ = 0 ≥ Random-Graph-C ≈ No-A ≥
SDA with ρ = 1 ≥ Random-A. It is apparent that the network
density of a given network significantly affects both security
and performance since SDA with ρ = −0.6 and SDA with
ρ = 0 have relatively fewer edges after adaptation and perform
better than the other schemes in terms of Pc, Sg and SD (i.e.,
the average software diversity level), as shown in Figs. 3 (a)-
(c).
In Fig. 3 (d), SDA with optimal ρ (set at −0.6) also shows
significant resilience with relatively low defense cost (Dc) as
Pa increases. The overall performance order for other five
schemes in Dc is: Random-Graph-C ≥ Random-A ≥ SDA
with ρ = 1 ≥ SDA with ρ = 0 ≥ No-A. Not only that
SDA schemes outperform the counterpart baseline schemes in
Pc, Sg , and SD, but also the defense cost of SDA schemes
are significantly lower than that of Random-Graph-C and are
comparable with Random-A (e.g., compared to SDA with
optimal ρ = −0.6) and No-A (e.g., compared to SDA with
ρ = 0). This is a significant merit as SDA-based schemes
outperform the counterpart baseline schemes with relatively
low defense cost.
2) Effect of Varying the Number of Software Packages
(Ns): Fig. 4 shows the effect of varying the number of
software packages available (Ns) on the performance of the
six schemes with respect to the metrics defined in Section V-A
under the dense network. We observe that increasing the
number of software packages available (Ns) increases software
diversity (SD) and the size of the giant component (Sg) while
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(a) Fraction of compromised nodes (Pc) (b) Size of a giant component (Sg) (c) Software diversity (SD) (d) Defense cost (Dc)
Fig. 3. Effect of varying the fraction of attackers (Pa) under a dense network.
(a) Fraction of compromised nodes (Pc) (b) Size of a giant component (Sg) (c) Software diversity (SD) (d) Defense cost (Dc)
Fig. 4. Effect of the number of software packages (Ns) under a dense network.
(a) Fraction of compromised nodes (Pc) (b) Size of a giant component (Sg) (c) Software diversity (SD) (d) Defense cost (Dc)
Fig. 5. Effect of varying the fraction of attackers (Pa) under a medium network.
(a) Fraction of compromised nodes (Pc) (b) Size of a giant component (Sg) (c) Software diversity (SD) (d) Defense cost (Dc)
Fig. 6. Effect of the number of software packages (Ns) under a medium network.
decreasing the percentage of compromised nodes (Pc) and
the defense cost (Dc). Note that based on the concept of
N -version programming, the number of software packages
(Ns) here refers to the number of versions being implemented
for the same piece of software. Hence, as Ns increases, the
software diversity strength increases, resulting in a decrease
of the percentage of nodes being compromised due to attacks,
an increase of the network connectivity, and a decrease of the
defense cost because less nodes are being compromised.
The overall performance order in Pc, Sg , and SD is very
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similar to what we observed in Fig. 3, with SDA with optimal
ρ = −0.6 outperforming all other schemes. For Dc, SDA with
optimal ρ = −0.6 generates a defense cost comparable to that
generated by Random-A and in-between those generated by
No-A (lowest cost) and Random-Graph-C (highest cost).
B. Comparative Performance Analysis Under a Medium Net-
work
1) Effect of Varying the Fraction of Initial Attacks (Pa):
Fig. 5 demonstrates the effect of varying the percentage
of initial attacks on metrics defined in Section V-A under
the medium network, whose network topology and degree
distribution are shown in Fig.1 (b) of the appendix file. Similar
to Fig. 3, Fig. 5 also shows that increasing the percentage of
attackers (Pa) decreases software diversity (SD) and the size
of the giant component (Sg) while increasing the percentage
of compromised nodes (Pc) and the defense cost (Dc).
The overall performance order in terms of Pc (representing
network security) and Sg (representing network connectivity
and resilience) is: SDA with optimal ρ = −0.4 ≥ SDA with
ρ = 0 ≥ SDA with ρ = 1 ≈ Random-A ≥ Random-Graph-
C ≈ No-A. In terms of SD (software diversity), a similar
performance order is observed except that Random-Graph-
C has a higher SD than No-A. These results demonstrate
that SDA schemes clearly are more effective than traditional
software shuffling schemes that do not change the network
topology (e.g., Random-Graph-C). For the defense cost(Dc),
the overall performance order (the lower cost the better) is:
Random-Graph-C ≥ SDA with optimal ρ = −0.4 ≥ Random-
A ≈ SDA with ρ = 1 ≥ SDA with ρ = 0 ≥ No-A.
Again these results support the claim that SDA-based schemes
incur relatively low cost, while outperforming all counterpart
baseline schemes in Pc, Sg , and SD.
2) Effect of Varying the Number of Software Packages
(Ns): Fig. 6 shows the effect of Ns on performance under
the medium network. We again observe that increasing the
number of software packages available (Ns) increases software
diversity (SD) and the size of the giant component (Sg) while
decreasing the percentage of compromised nodes (Pc) and
the defense cost (Dc). The overall performance order is the
same as that in Figs. 5, with SDA with optimal ρ = −0.4
outperforming all other schemes in terms of SD, Sg , and Pc
and performing comparably to Random-A in terms of Dc.
By comparing Fig. 6 (for the medium dense network) with
Fig. 4 (for the dense network), we also observe that SDA
with optimal ρ is more effective in the dense network. We
attribute this to node density. That is, SDA is more effective
when there are many node connections between nodes in the
network allowing SDA to effectively decide which edges to
add or remove to effectively maximize software diversity (SD)
and the size of the giant component (Sg) thereby minimizing
the percentage of compromised nodes (Pc).
C. Comparative Performance Analysis Under a Sparse Net-
work
1) Effect of Varying the Fraction of Initial Attacks (Pa):
Fig. 7 shows the effect of varying the initial attack density (Pa)
on the performance of the five schemes with respect to the 4
performance metrics discussed in Section V-A under the sparse
network, whose network topology and degree distribution are
shown in Fig. 1 (c) of the appendix file. Unlike in the cases
of medium and dense networks, the SDA with optimal ρ
scheme in the sparse network is the same as the SDA with
ρ = 1 scheme which restores all edges from the lost edges
in Step 1 (i.e., ρ = 1). Therefore, we only show comparative
experimental results of the five schemes.
In the sparse network, the degrees of most nodes are very
small, implying that nodes are minimally connected where
most nodes only have 1-3 neighbors at most. This means
that the network itself is relatively much less vulnerable to
epidemic attacks because the attackers inherently cannot reach
many nodes to compromise due to network sparsity. On the
other hand, this means that when there is a higher percentage
of attackers, the damage upon an attack success (i.e., failing
or compromising a node) is more detrimental by resulting in
a much smaller size of the giant component representing a
significantly lower network resilience (or availability), which
introduces a great hindrance to providing continuous services
due to a lack of paths available from a source to a destination.
This trend can be clearly observed with the sharp decrease
in the size of the giant component (Sg) under high attack
density (i.e., Pa = 0.24), when compared to the corresponding
results under the medium network (i.e., Fig. 5 (b)). A more
interesting result is that the overall performance trend does
not follow the previous results shown under the dense network
(i.e., Fig. 3) and medium network (i.e., Fig. 5) which have a
sufficiently larger number of edges than the sparse network.
The performance order in Sg is: SDA with optimal ρ = 1 ≥
Random-A ≥ Random-Graph-C ≈ No-A ≥ SDA with ρ = 0.
Since the original network itself is sparsely connected, SDA
with ρ = 0 is not as effective as shown in our previous results
for Sg under the dense network (see Fig. 3) and medium
network (see Fig. 5). SDA with optimal ρ = 1 with all edges
restored from the lost edges in Step 1 performs the best in
Sg . This result is reasonable because the sparse network does
not need to disconnect more edges because it is already sparse
enough and significantly less vulnerable to epidemic attacks.
The overall performance with respect to Pc is very similar
among all the five schemes, with slightly better results in
two SDA schemes. Similarly to the result shown for the
dense network, Random-Graph-C exhibits the same level of
performance as No-A in Pc and Sg , but with a higher software
diversity (SD). This indicates the advantage of topology-aware
adaptation in a sparse network. For the defense cost (Dc)
the performance order is: Random-Graph-C ≥ Random-A ≥
SDA with optimal ρ = 1 ≥ SDA with ρ = 0 ≥ No-A. It
is interesting to observe that all SDA-based schemes incur
a lower defense cost than Random-A and Random-Graph-C
possibly due to fewer compromised nodes in the system and
thus less frequent IDS interventions.
2) Effect of Varying the Number of Software Packages (Ns):
Fig. 8 shows the effect of varying the number of software pack-
ages available (Ns) on the performance of the five schemes
under the sparse network. As expected, as Ns increases, SD
(software diversity) increases and Dc (defense cost) decreases.
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(a) Fraction of compromised nodes (Pc) (b) Size of a giant component (Sg) (c) Software diversity (SD) (d) Defense cost (Dc)
Fig. 7. Effect of varying the fraction of attackers (Pa) under a sparse network.
(a) Fraction of compromised nodes (Pc) (b) Size of a giant component (Sg) (c) Software diversity (SD) (d) Defense cost (Dc)
Fig. 8. Effect of the number of software packages (Ns) under a sparse network.
As Ns increases, Sg (size of the giant component) also
increases for all schemes except for the SDA with optimal
ρ = 1 scheme. The reason is that when ρ = 1, SDA will
restore all edges removed in Step 1 (see Step 1 in Algorithm 1).
When Ns is higher, fewer edges will be removed in Step 1
because of a smaller probability that two neighbor nodes will
have the same software package. Consequently, when Ns is
higher, the very same smaller number of edges will be added
back in Step 2 (see Step 2 in Algorithm 1), thus resulting in
the size of the giant component in the shuffled topology not
necessarily larger than the one when Ns is lower.
By comparing Fig. 8 (for the sparse network) with Fig. 6
(for the medium dense network) and Fig. 4 (for the dense
network), we notice that SDA with optimal ρ is most effective
in the dense network. We conclude that our proposed SDA
algorithm is most effective in a dense network under which
SDA can effectively decide which edges among many to add
or remove to effectively maximize software diversity (SD) and
the size of the giant component (Sg) as well as minimizing
the percentage of compromised nodes (Pc).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A. Summary
In this section, we summarize the contributions of this work:
• We proposed a software diversity metric based on vulnera-
bilities of attack paths reachable to each node. We called
this scheme ‘software diversity-based adaptation’ (SDA)
and used it to adapt edges to generate a resilient network
topology that can minimize security vulnerability while
maximizing network resilience (or connectivity) to provide
seamless services under epidemic attacks.
• We conducted extensive simulation experiments in order
to demonstrate the performance of the proposed SDA
scheme compared against other existing counterpart baseline
schemes (i.e., random adaptation, random graph coloring,
and no adaptation). Via extensive simulation experiments,
we found our proposed SDA scheme outperforms coun-
terpart baseline schemes in terms of the fraction of com-
promised nodes by epidemic attacks, the size of the giant
component, and the level of software diversity. In addition,
we analyzed the defense cost associated with each scheme
and proved the proposed SDA scheme incurs comparable
defense cost over existing counterparts.
• We also identified the optimal setting for executing SDA
to meet the imposed performance goals. This allows each
node to efficiently compute its software diversity value
and use it for adapting edges to maximize its software
diversity, leading to minimizing security vulnerability while
maximizing network connectivity.
• We conducted an extensive simulation study with four
different real networks in order to investigate the effect
of network density on the optimal setting of SDA under
which it can best achieve the dual goals of security (i.e.,
minimum vulnerability) and performance (i.e., maximum
network connectivity).
• We effectively incorporated the techniques of percola-
tion theory in the network science domain into software
diversity-based security analysis in the computer science
domain. To be specific, in terms of the computer science
perspective, the proposed software diversity metric used
attack path vulnerabilities, which are derived based on
software vulnerabilities of the intermediate nodes on the
attack paths. On the other hand, in terms of the network
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science perspective, this work also adopted percolation
theory to examine the effect of software diversity-based edge
adaptation on network resilience measured by the size of the
giant component. Based on the rationale that network in-
terconnectivity can increase both network vulnerability and
network connectivity [5], this work addressed the tradeoff
relationship in the context of cybersecurity, which has not
been addressed in the literature.
B. Key Findings
From our extensive simulation experiments, we obtained the
following key findings:
• Overall under epidemic attacks, more interconnectivity be-
tween nodes in a network introduces higher security vulner-
ability while bringing a larger size of the giant component,
implying higher network connectivity. In addition, when two
nodes use the same software package where the vulnerability
of the software package is known to an attacker, it provides
a high advantage to the attacker. How nodes are connected
to each other is highly critical in determining the network’s
vulnerability to epidemic attacks.
• Even if two network topologies have the same network
density (i.e., the same number of edges), how nodes are
connected to each other can vastly change the extent of
the security vulnerability to epidemic attacks. It is even
possible that a sparser network may introduce more security
vulnerability than a denser network depending on how the
nodes are connected to each other.
• It is not necessary to consider the entire network topology
for each node to make effective edge adaptation decisions to
minimize security vulnerability while maximizing network
connectivity. Our SDA algorithm allows each node to make
effective decisions on edge adaptation in a lightweight
manner. This is because edge adaptation decisions are
determined based on ranking of node software vulnerability
values, which is more flexible than using a threshold, to
achieve the dual goals of security and performance.
• Under medium dense and dense networks, our SDA
scheme significantly outperforms existing counterpart base-
line schemes. However, under the sparse network, although
our SDA scheme still outperforms other schemes, the differ-
ence was less significant. We conclude that our SDA scheme
is most effective in a dense network under which SDA can
effectively decide which edges among many existing con-
nections to add or remove to effectively maximize software
diversity and the size of the giant component as well as
minimizing the percentage of compromised nodes.
• Our proposed SDA scheme is extremely resilient to harsh
environments. The performance gain relative to counterpart
baseline schemes increases as the environment is harsher,
i.e., as the percentage of attackers increases or as the number
of the software packages decreases. This proves the high
resilience of the proposed SDA scheme under a highly
disadvantageous environment.
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APPENDIX A
ALGORITHMS
The following algorithms are referenced from the main
paper. They are as follows:
• Algorithm 1 (SDBA): Remove edges between two nodes
with the same software package, which is Step 1 in the
SDA algorithm (Algorithm 1).
• Algorithm 2 (GenPV): Generate path vulnerabilities.
This algorithm returns a vector PV that contains the
maximum attack path vulnerability where each attack
path is a disjoint shortest path from node i to a node with
the maximum k − 1 hop distance.
• Algorithm 3 (SetEAB): Set edge adaptations budget.
This algorithm returns T global, which is the total number
of edges to be adapted based on a given fraction of edges
to be adapted, ρ, and a vector of the number of edges to
be adapted per node, Tlocal.
• Algorithm 4 (GEAC): Generate edge addition candi-
dates. This algorithm returns a vector of edge candidates
to be added based on the lowest software diversity reduc-
tion.
• Algorithm 5 (GERC): Generate edge removal candi-
dates. This algorithm returns a vector of edge candidates
to be removed based on the highest software diversity
increase.
• Algorithm 6 (AdaptNT): Adapt network topology.
Based on the above two algorithms, GEAC and GERC,
T global number of edges are adapted (removed or added)
where each node adapts its edge based on Tlocal based on
SetEAB above.
• Algorithm 7 (Random-A): This algorithm is one of com-
parable counterpart schemes and compared with the pro-
posed SDA-based schemes. This algorithm uses the same
procedure in Step 1 as the SDA (i.e., SDBA in Algorithm
1). In Step 2, an edge addition is performed randomly
for the number of nodes lost in Step 1 only based on the
condition that two nodes use different software packages.
• Algorithm 8: This algorithm describes how the epidemic
attacks are modeled in this work.
• Qisheng Zhang, Jin-Hee Cho, and Ing-Ray Chen are with the De-
partment of Computer Science, Virginia Tech, Falls Church, VA,
USA. Email: {qishengz19, jicho, irchen}@vt.edu. Terrence J. Moore is
with US Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, MD, USA. Email: ter-
rence.j.moore.civ@mail.mil.
Algorithm 1 Software Diversity-based Basic Adaptation
(SDBA)
1: N ← The total number of nodes in a network
2: DN ← A vector containing the number of removed edges
per node
3: A←An adjacency matrix for a given network with element
aij for i, j = 1, . . . , N
4: S ← A vector of software packages installed over nodes
with element si for i = 1, . . . , N
5: A′ ← An adjacency matrix after edges are adapted.
6:
7: SDBA(N,DN,A,S) . Remove edges between two nodes
with the same software package.
8: for i := 1 to N do
9: for j := 1 to N do
10: if (aij > 0) ∧ si == sj then
11: aij = 0
12: aji = 0
13: DN(i) = DN(i) + 1
14: DN(j) = DN(j) + 1
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: return A′
Algorithm 2 Generate Path Vulnerabilities (GenPV)
1: A←An adjacency matrix for a given network with element
aij for i, j = 1, . . . , N
2: S ← A vector of software packages installed over nodes
with element si for i = 1, . . . , N
3: APV ← A vector of vulnerabilities of attack paths apvij
from node i to node j where j = 1, . . . , 20 .
For simplicity, consider maximum 20 shortest disjoint attack
paths reachable to node i
4: k ← A hop distance given in a node’s local network
5: PV ← A vector of maximum path vulnerabilities for all
nodes i where pvi refers to the maximum attack path
vulnerability where the path consists of at most k − 1-hop
distance from node i . Count one hop from a node to any
neighboring node and thus k is decremented by 1.
6: PV = GenPV(A,APV,S, k)
7: for i := 1 to N do
8: pvi = max
j
apvk−1ij
9: end for
10: return PV
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Algorithm 3 Set Edge Adaptations Budget (SetEAB)
1: A←An adjacency matrix for a given network with element
aij for i, j = 1, . . . , N
2: DN ← A vector containing the number of removed edges
per node
3: ρ ← A threshold referring to the fraction of edges to be
adapted
4: κi ← Node i’s degree
5: T global ← The total number of edges to be adapted
6: Tlocal ← A vector of the number of edges that are allowed
to be adapted per node where an element is denoted by
T locali for node i for i = 1, . . . , N
7:
8: Tlocal, T global = SetEAB(DN,A, ρ)
9: T global = |ρ sum(DN)
2
|
10: κ = sum(A)+T
global
N
. An expected average degree after
T global number of edges are adapted
11: if ρ > 0 then
12: T locali ← max(0, κ− κi) . T locali captures the number of
edges that can be added
13: NHD =
∑N
i=1max(0, κi − κ)− T global
14: else
15: T locali ← max(0, κi − κ) . T locali captures the number of
edges that can be removed
16: NHD =
∑N
i=1max(0, κ− κi)− T global
17: end if . Positive NHD
means that more nodes have higher (or lower) degrees than
the expected average degree while negative NHD implies
fewer nodes have higher (lower) degrees than the average
expected degree after edge adaptations. Hence, when NHD
is positive, edge adaptations should be restricted further.
18: while NHD > 0 do
19: for i := 1 to N do
20: if T locali > 0 ∧NHD > 0 then
21: T locali = T
local
i − 1
22: NHD = NHD − 1
23: end if
24: end for
25: end while
26: return T global,Tlocal
APPENDIX B
REAL NETWORK TOPOLOGIES USED
This work develops a topology-aware notion of software
diversity and, hence it makes sense to study the effect of
different network topologies. To meet this objective, we con-
sidered three different network datasets, each with different
levels of network density.
A dense network (DN) is generated from a Facebook ego
network, which is a connected component from the one of
the 10 ego networks provided by SNAP [1]. This network
has density of approximately 0.05 with a mean degree near
52. A visualization of this network is shown in Fig. 1 (a) and
its degree distribution is shown in Fig. 1 (d). The distribution
is right-skewed despite the high mean.
A medium dense network (MN) is generated from a
subset of the Enron email dataset on SNAP [1]. This medium
dense network is generated by the largest connected compo-
nent of the induced subgraph of nodes ranked between 501
and 1500 by degree. This was done to generate a network
with a similar size to the dense network from an original
network that starts with less density. The density is 0.016
with a mean degree near 16. A visualization of this network
Algorithm 4 Generate Edge Addition Candidates (GEAC)
1: N ← The total number of nodes in a network
2: A←An adjacency matrix for a given network with element
aij for i, j = 1, . . . , N
3: A∗ ← (A + I)2k where a∗ij is 1 when nodes i and j
belong to each other’s local network or its neighbor’s local
networks; 0 otherwise.
4: SD ← A vector of software diversity values, sdi for all
nodes i = 1, . . . , N
5: SV ← A vector of the vulnerabilities associated with soft-
ware packages
6: S ← A vector of software packages installed over nodes
with element si for i = 1, . . . , N
7: PV← GenPV(A,APV,S, k)
8: DN ← A vector containing the number of removed edges
per node
9: Tlocal ← GetEdgesToAdapt(DN,A, ρ)
10:
11: add_candidate = GEAC(A,SD,SV,S,PV,Tlocal)
12: r ← counter initialized at 0.
13: for i := 1 to N do
14: for j := i+ 1 to N do
15: if a∗ij > 0 ∧ aij == 0 ∧ si 6= sj then
16: sd_diff_sum(r) = (sdi − sd′i) + (sdj − sd′j)
17: . Sum of the improved software diversity values by both
node i and node j where the expected software diversity
values of nodes i and j after edge addition adaptations are
sd′i = sdi(1 − svsipvj), sd′j = sdj(1 − svsjpvi) based on
Eq. (3) of the main paper (i.e., software diversity metric)
18: r = r + 1
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: Rank sd_diff_sum in an ascending order and capture top
Tlocal edges in add_candidate
23: return add_candidate
is shown in Fig. 1 (b) and its degree distribution is shown in
Fig. 1 (e). The distribution has the shape close to a binomial
distribution.
A sparse network (SN) is generated from an observation
of the Internet at the autonomous systems level [1]. Edges
are removed from the recorded data to ensure a simple
network. The density of this network is approximately
0.003 and the mean node degree is approximately 4.4. A
visualization of this network is shown in Fig. 1 (c) and its
degree distribution is shown in Fig. 1 (f). The distribution
skews right and is close to a power-law shape.
APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENTS UNDER A RANDOM NETWORK
The work also considers a random network topology gener-
ated by an Erdös-Rényi (ER) random graph model G(n, p)
where n is the number of nodes and p is the connection
probability between any pair of nodes [2]. This model is
ideal to study the effect of network density in a general
manner by varying the connection probability p since the
network has density approximately p for large n. It is used
here for a sensitivity analysis and comparative analysis for
the methods considered in the paper.
C.1 Visualization of an ER Network
A visualization of the example ER network for n = 1000
and p = 0.025 is shown in Fig. 2 (a). This realization of
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(a) Dense network (DN) with 1033 nodes
and 26747 edges
(b) Medium dense network (MN) with 985
nodes and 7994 edges
(c) Sparse network (SN) with 1476 nodes
and 3254 edges
(d) DN’s degree distribution (e) MN’s degree distribution (f) SN’s degree distribution
Fig. 1. The network topologies used for our experimental study and their degree distributions.
(a) Erdös-Rényi random network (ER) with
1000 nodes and 12473 edges using p = 0.025
(b) ER’s degree distribution
Fig. 2. The network topology of a random network used for our experimental study and its degree distribution.
the ER model has density 0.02497, which is very close to
p, and has the mean node degree 24.946, which is close to
the expected value p(n− 1). The degree distribution of this
network realization, shown in Fig. 2 (b), has is very close to
a binomial distribution.
C.2 Identification of an Optimal Fraction of Edges to be
Adapted (ρ)
We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the effect of the
fraction of edges to be adapted (ρ) for the random network
here. Fig. 3 shows the size of the giant component (Sg) and
the fraction of compromised nodes (Pc) versus varying ρ.
We used Pa = 0.1, Ns = 5, and p = 0.025 for corresponding
simulations. We observe that Sg attains its maximum when
ρ = −0.6, which will be used as the optimal ρ for the
comparative analysis conducted in Section C.3.
C.3 Comparative Performance Analysis
This section details our comparative analysis of the six
schemes introduced in Section 5.2 under a random network.
(a) Random Network
Fig. 3. Effect of the threshold of the fraction of edges adapted (ρ) on
network connectivity (Sg) and security vulnerability (Pc).
C.3.1 Effect of Network Density Under a Random Network
Fig. 4 shows how the network density, controlled by the
ER connectivity parameter p, affects the performance of the
six schemes with respect to the four performance metrics
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Algorithm 5 Generate Edge Removal Candidates (GERC)
1: N ← The total number of nodes in a network
2: A←An adjacency matrix for a given network with element
aij for i, j = 1, . . . , N
3: A∗ ← (A + I)2k where a∗ij is 1 when nodes i and j
belong to each other’s local network or its neighbor’s local
networks; 0 otherwise.
4: SD ← A vector of software diversity values, sdi for all
nodes i = 1, . . . , N
5: SV ← A vector of the vulnerabilities associated with soft-
ware packages
6: S ← A vector of software packages installed over nodes
with element si for i = 1, . . . , N
7: PV← GenPV(A,APV,S, k)
8: DN ← A vector containing the number of removed edges
per node
9: Tlocal ← GetEdgesToAdapt(DN,A, ρ)
10:
11: remove_candidate = GERC(A,SD,SV,S,PV,Tlocal)
12: for i := 1 to N do
13: for j := i+ 1 to N do
14: if aij > 0 then
15: sd_diff_sum(r) = (sd′i − sdi) + (sd′j − sdj)
16: . Sum of the improved software diversity values by both
node i and node j where the expected software diversity
values of nodes i and j after edge removal adaptations are
sd′i = sdi/(1 − svsipvj), sd′j = sdj/(1 − svsjpvi) based on
Eq. (3) of the main paper (i.e., software diversity metric)
17: r = r + 1
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: Rank sd_diff_sum in an descending order and capture top
Tlocal edges in remove_candidate
22: return remove_candidate
listed in Section 5.1 of the main paper. Overall, as the node
connection probability p increases, the network is exposed
to higher vulnerability with respect to epidemic attacks
because the attackers have more neighbors and, hence,
more potential nodes to compromise. Since the number of
software packages available Ns is limited to 5, as density in-
creases, an attacker has a better chance to come into contact
with a neighboring node that has a software package shared
or previously learned by the attacker. Since higher network
connectivity naturally leads to higher vulnerability to epi-
demic attacks, as more nodes are connected, the attacks
exhibit a greater impact. After attacks on the original or
adapted network, the resulting outcome is a less connected
network with a smaller size of the giant component. This
post-attack network also has a lower software diversity
value as a fewer number of nodes will be considered in the
attack path to estimate the software diversity, as shown in
Eq. (3) in Section 4.1. Therefore, when p is low, significant
performance differences by all schemes are not observed.
On the other hand, as p increases, schemes with lower
adapted network density (i.e., SDA with ρ = 0 and SDA
with optimal ρ = −0.6) outperform the other counterparts
(i.e., No-A, Random-A, Random-Graph-C and SDA with
ρ = 1).
Overall the best performing method with respect to the
three metrics is shown with SDA with ρ = −0.6. SDA with
ρ = −0.6 also shows significant resilience among all four
performance metrics. The performance order in the fraction
Algorithm 6 Adapt Network Topology (AdaptNT)
. Adapt edges based on Algorithms 4 and 5
1: N ← # of nodes in a given network
2: DN← a vector with # of disconnected edges per node
3: A← an adjacency matrix for a given network
4: SV← a constant vulnerability vector for software packages
5: S← a software package vector for a given network
6: k ← hop distance of local networks
7: l← search threshold of # of attack paths
8: ρ← threshold of the fraction of edges adapted
9: candidate ← A vector of edge candidates, either
add_candidate in Algorithms 4 or 5
10: Tlocal, T global = SetEAB(DN,A, ρ) based on Algorithm 3
11: A′ ← An adjacency network after edges are adapted.
12:
13: A′ = AdaptNT(A, candidate,Tlocal, T global, ρ)
14: for (i, j, sd_diff_sum) in candidate do
15: if T locali T localj > 0 then
16: if ρ > 0 then
17: aij = aji = 1
18: else
19: aij = aji = 0
20: end if
21: T locali = T
local
i − 1
22: T localj = T
local
j − 1
23: T global = T global − 1
24: end if
25: end for
26: for (i, j, sd_diff_sum) in candidate do
27: if T global > 0 then
28: if ρ > 0 ∧ aij == 0 then
29: aij = aji = 1
30: T global = T global − 1
31: else
32: if ρ < 0 ∧ aij > 0 then
33: aij = aji = 0
34: T global = T global − 1
35: end if
36: end if
37: end if
38: end for
39: return A′
of compromised nodes (Pc), the size of the giant component
(Sg) and software diversity (SD) is: SDA with ρ = −0.6 ≥
SDA with ρ = 0 ≥ SDA with ρ = 1 ≈ Random-A ≥
Random-Graph-C ≈ No-A. Although Random-Graph-C ex-
hibits slightly better performance than No-A, both schemes
perform nearly identically. This implies that the contribution
of shuffling is minimal under the random network model.
With respect to the defense cost (Dc), the overall perfor-
mance order follows: SDA with ρ = 0 ≈ No-A ≥ SDA with
ρ = 1 ≈ Random-A ≥ SDA with ρ = −0.6 ≥ Random-
Graph-C. Random-Graph-C incurs the highest cost since the
shuffling cost and the cost caused by the IDS are combined
when calculating the defense cost using Eq. (11) in Section
5.1 of the main paper. Although adaptation schemes incur
higher cost than No-A, as nodes are more connected with
higher p, SDA with ρ = 0 generates significantly lower cost
than the other existing counterparts. This is because well-
adapted network topologies are less vulnerable to epidemic
attacks. In these networks, a significantly fewer number of
nodes become compromised and, hence, detected by the
IDS, which disconnects all the edges from the detected and
compromised nodes. On the other hand, non-adapted or
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Algorithm 7 Random Adaptation (Random-A)
1: N ← The total number of nodes in a network
2: DN← a vector with # of disconnected edges per node
3: A← an adjacency matrix for a given network
4: S ← A vector of software packages installed over nodes
with element si for i = 1, . . . , N
5: SV ← A vector of the vulnerabilities associated with soft-
ware packages
6: k ← A hop distance given in a node’s local network
7: l ← A maximum number of attack paths considered for
estimating a node’s software diversity
8: ρ ← A threshold referring to the fraction of edges to be
adapted
9: A′ ← An adjacency matrix after edges are adapted.
10:
11: A′ = Random-A(N,DN,A,S,SV, k, l, ρ)
12: Step 1: A′ = SDBA(N,DN,A,S,SV, k, l, ρ) .
Remove edges between two nodes with the same software
package (see Algorithm 1). DN is a vector of edges that are
removed in Step 1.
13:
14: Step 2: Add random edges between two disconnected
nodes if their software packages are different
15: for i := 1 to N do
16: candidate ← a vector of nodes that can be connected
with node i where aij == 0 ∧ (nai · naj > 0) for node j
17: visited← a vector with length(candidate)
18: for j := 1 to DN(i) do
19: r ← A random integer selected from
[0, length(candidate)] at random.
20: if visited(r) == 0 ∧DN(r) > 0 then
21: air = 1
22: ari = 1
23: DN(i) = DN(i)− 1
24: DN(r) = DN(r)− 1
25: visited(r) = 1
26: else
27: j = j − 1
28: end if
29: if sum(visited) == length(visited) then
30: . all candidate nodes are selected
31: break
32: end if
33: end for
34: end for
35: return A′
poorly adapted network topologies result in more actions
by the IDS, which will disconnect all the edges of nodes that
are detected as compromised to protect the network itself.
C.3.2 Effect of the Fraction of Initial Seeding Attackers (Pa)
under a Random Network
Fig. 5 demonstrates how the different levels of attack density
impact the performance of all comparing schemes with
respect to the performance metrics in Section 5.1 under the
random network topology. The overall trends of the perfor-
mance as more seeding attackers are added in the network
are as follows. An increase of the fraction of seeding attack-
ers decreases software diversity and the size of the giant
component, while at the same time increasing the fraction of
compromised nodes and defense costs. This latter effect is
because more nodes become compromised and accordingly
more site percolation-based adaptations are required by the
IDS (i.e., disconnecting all edges to a detected, compromised
node). Also across the range of the attack density and with
respect to all metrics expect defense cost (Dc), the overall
performance order clearly follows: SDA with ρ = −0.6 ≥
SDA with ρ = 0 ≥ SDA with ρ = 1 ≈ Random-A ≥
Random-Graph-C ≈ No-A. As for defense cost (Dc), the
overall performance order follows: SDA with ρ = 0 ≈No-A
≥ SDA with ρ = 1 ≈ Random-A ≥ SDA with ρ = −0.6 ≥
Random-Graph-C.
C.3.3 Effect of the Number of Software Packages (Ns)
Under a Random Network
Fig. 6 shows how a different number of software packages
(Ns) available impacts the performance in terms of the
metrics in Section 5.1 under the random network model.
Similar to the previous results displayed in Figs. 4 and
5, the degree of software diversity is well aligned with
that of the size of the giant component. But, noticeably,
SDA with optimal ρ = −0.6 performs the best with high
resiliency even under a very small Ns. In fact, this scheme
shows steady performance in terms of all the metrics except
software diversity (SD) across the range of Ns considered
in this work. This is due to the low network density and our
intelligent edge adaptation. On the other hand, the other
five schemes exhibit improved performance when Ns is
increased because the availability of more software pack-
ages can significantly contribute to increasing the degree
of software diversity of each node. Unlike the previous
results shown in Figs. 4 (d) and 5 (d), Random-Graph-A
attains maximum defense cost when Ns = 4. This is due
to two conflicting related factors: On the one hand, a node
has more options to choose with more software packages
available, i.e., a much lower chance to choose the same
software package as the one the node currently has, thereby
increasing the likelihood of shuffling and the shuffling cost.
On the other hand, the network becomes more secure when
more software packages are available, which results in lower
IDS cost.
APPENDIX D
IDENTIFICATION OF OPTIMAL k UNDER A RANDOM
NETWORK
Fig. 7 shows the sensitivity analysis when varying k used in
the software diversity metric of the SDA with l = 1 and ρ =
−0.6. We observe that both Sg and Pc are not sensitive when
k varies from 1 to 5. Thus, we use k = 1 in our experiments
to minimize computational complexity.
APPENDIX E
IDENTIFICATION OF OPTIMAL l UNDER A RANDOM
NETWORK
Fig. 8 shows the sensitivity analysis under varying l used in
estimating the software diversity metric of the SDA when
k = 1 and ρ = −0.6. We observe that both Sg and Pc are
not sensitive to varying l from 1 to 9. Thus, we set l = 1 in
our experiments to minimize computational complexity.
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(a) Fraction of compromised nodes
(Pc)
(b) Size of the giant component (Sg) (c) Software diversity (SD) (d) Defense cost (Dc)
Fig. 4. Effect of the connection probability between two nodes (p) under random networks.
(a) Fraction of compromised nodes
(Pc)
(b) Size of the giant component (Sg) (c) Software diversity (SD) (d) Defense cost (Dc)
Fig. 5. Effect of varying the fraction of seeding attacks (Pa) under a random network.
(a) % of compromised nodes (Pc)(b) Size of the giant component (Sg) (c) Software diversity (SD) (d) Defense cost (Dc)
Fig. 6. Effect of the number of software packages (Ns) under a random network.
Fig. 7. Effect of varying k (a maximum hop distance) on network con-
nectivity (Sg) and security vulnerability (Pc) under a random network.
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1: Input:
2: A← an adjacency matrix
3: σi ← attacker i’ vector of exploitable software packages
4: Ns ← a number of software packages available
5: γ ← an intrusion detection probability
6: node ← nodes’ attributes, defined in Eq. (1) of the main
paper.
7: S← a software package vector for a given network
8: SV ← A vector of the vulnerabilities associated with soft-
ware packages
9: procedure PERFORMEPIDEMICATTACKS(A, node, SV, σj ,
Ns, γ)
10: spreadDone← 0
11: spread: a list with length N , initialized at 0 . To check
if node i attempted to compromise its direct neighbors
12: while spreadDone == 0 do
13: for i := 1 to N do . check if i is an attacker
14: if nai > 0 then . If i is an active attacker
15: r1 ← a random real number in [0, 1] based on
uniform distribution
16: if nci > 0 then
17: if r1 > γ ∧ spread(i) < 2 then
18: spread(i) = spread(i) + 1
19: for j := 1 to N do
20: if aij > 0 ∧ naj > 0 ∧ ncj == 0
then . if j is susceptible
21: if σi includes sj then . i knows
sj ’s vulnerability
22: ncj = 1 . j is compromised
by i
23: else
24: r2 ← a random real number
in [0, 1]
25: d← svsj
26: if r2 < d then
27: ncj = 1 . j is
compromised by i
28: σi(sj) = 1 . i learned
sj ’s vulnerability
29: end if
30: end if
31: end if
32: end for
33: else
34: nai = 0 . i is detected and deactivated
for infecting behavior
35: aij = 0, aji = 0 . disconnecting all
edges connected to i
36: end if
37: else
38: if r1 > γ then
39: nai = 0
40: aij = 0, aji = 0
41: end if
42: end if
43: end if
44: for k := 1 to N do
45: if nai > 0 ∧ nci > 0 ∧ spread(k) < 2 then .
each node has two chances to compromise each of its direct
neighbors
46: spreadDone = 0
47: break
48: else
49: spreadDone = 1
50: end if
51: end for
52: end for
53: end while
54: end procedure
